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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the relationship between ultimate ownership concentration and the extent of leverage in the 
context of Malaysia. The data of this study include 478 publicly listed firms from2001 to 2012. The results show that 
ultimate ownership concentration has U-shaped relationship with leverage, with the turning point being at the ownership 
concentration of 42%. Based on signalling theory, the results show that a moderate extent of ultimate ownership 
concentration tends to adopt lower leverage for they have higher incentives to self-monitor managerial opportunistic 
decision making; by contrast, an ultimate owner who holds excessively high concentration of shareholdings shows self-
benefitting behaviour, with the owner tending to adopt higher leverage to sustain the loss of firm value from expropriation. 
However, higher institutional ownership concentration plays a significant monitoring role over the owner’s opportunistic 
behaviour through the signalling of lower leverage even when the shareholding of ultimate owner is excessively large. 
Keywords: Ultimate ownership; leverage; nonlinear; institution ownership; Malaysia
ABSTRAK
Kajian ini mengkaji hubungan antara pemusatan pemilikan utama and leveraj firma dalam Malaysia konteks. Kajian 
ini menggunakan data daripada 478 buah syarikat tersenarai dari tahun 2001 hingga 2012. Keputusan kajian ini 
memaparkan hubungan tersebut adalah bercorak-U, dengan titik perubahan berada pada tahap 42 peratus pemilikan 
utama. Mengikut teori signal, keputusan tersebut menggambarkan bahawa pemusatan pemilikan utama yang sederhana 
cenderung untuk menggunakan leveraj yang rendah, kerana pemilik menggunakan peranan leveraj untuk mengawasi 
kesempatan pengurus dalam membuat keputusan bagi kepentingan sendiri; sebaliknya, pemilik utama yang mempunyai 
pemusatan pemilikan yang tinggi cenderung untuk menyalahgunakan sumber firma untuk kepentingan sendiri, dengan 
itu, mereka suka akan leveraj yang tinggi untuk mengekalkan nilai firma. Walau bagaimanapun, pemusatan pemilikan 
institusi yang tinggi memainkan peranan yang penting untuk mengawasi tingkah laku pemilik yang bersifat oportunistik, 
di mana leveraj yang rendah telah digunakan walaupun pemusatan pemilikan utama adalah tinggi. 
Kata kunci: Pemilikan utama; leveraj; nonlinear; pemilikan institusi; Malaysia 
INTRODUCTION
One of the key features of the corporate ownership 
structure in Malaysia is that owners have a high ownership 
concentration, enabling them to fully control the important 
decisions made for the firms. Malaysia is ranked among 
the highest in terms of ownership concentration in East 
Asian countries, with the top five shareholders owning 
58.8% of outstanding shares in the year 1998 (Capulong 
et al. 2000: 22) and 62% of outstanding shares over the 
period 1996-2000 (Haniffa & Hudaib 2006). The latest 
study by Yunos et al. (2010) documents that 96.76% of 
Malaysian firms have a high ownership concentration.
In this environment of high ownership concentration, 
the majority of the publicly listed firms are controlled by 
dominant shareholders or the ultimate owners (Claessens 
et al. 2000; Song et al. 2006-2007, Winter 2006-2007). 
In Malaysia, the majority of owners control their firms 
through indirect shareholdings by a chain of firms that are 
privatelyheld (Song 2007). This situation indicates that 
only accessing the direct shareholdings cannot reveal the 
true shareholdings of owners,given that the significance 
of indirect shareholdings far exceeds that of direct 
shareholdings due to the preferences of the majority of 
owners to keep their actual ownership less clear through 
indirect shareholdings, as suggested by Capulong et al. 
(2000) and The World Bank (2005). Accordingly, this 
study manually identifies the ultimate owners of firms by 
taking into account the aggregation of direct and indirect 
shareholdingsof the owner in a firm, i.e., the ultimate 
ownership. 
Although a high ownership concentration can reduce 
problems of asymmetry by increasing the alignment of 
interests between managers and shareholders, as proposed 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976), it can lead to a host of other 
agency problems or moral hazard behaviours in the form 
of risk shifting, empire building, perquisite consumption 
and entrenchment at the expense of minority shareholders 
and the wealth of other stakeholders (Megginson1997).
Understanding how the ultimate owners utilize the power 
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of shareholdings to make important decisions for firms is 
critical. Therefore, it is vital to access whether the ultimate 
owners who have dominant voting rights in firms behave 
in a manner in which their interests are aligned with those 
of other shareholders by maximizing firm value, or on the 
contrary, they expropriate firm value at the expense of 
the other minority shareholders. Investigating the direct 
relationship between ultimate ownership concentration 
and firm value may be less informative in accessing the 
opportunistic behaviour of ultimate owners because there 
are a number of alternatives to sustain the decreasein firm 
value due to expropriation. In other words, expropriation 
may occur without indicating the decrease in firm value.
Accordingly, this study attempts to examine how 
the ultimate ownership concentration affects decision 
making concerning leverage from the agency perspective 
of signalling theory. When leverage is not efficiently 
managed, decision making concerning leverage is vital 
in affecting the firm’s opportunity for future growth. The 
inefficient use of leverage will increase default risks and 
is always viewed unfavourably by investors. Mehran 
(1992) stresses that capital structure models that ignore 
agency costs or agency problems are incomplete, and 
Pandey (2004) suggests a research gap concerning the 
conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers 
and between shareholders and debtholders on debt policy 
among Malaysian firms. The literature search in this study 
does not find any papers that access ultimate ownership 
concentration via direct and indirect shareholdings in 
the study of capital structure. This gap represents value 
added in the present study, which makes the strong 
argument that ultimate ownership concentration better 
reflects the true power of owners in decision making. 
The ultimate owner is expected to be the person who has 
vital influence on decision-making processes. The use of 
direct shareholdings, as shown in previous studies,may not 
comprehensively reflect the actual shareholding structure 
in Malaysia because majority of firms are controlled 
through indirect shareholdings by a chain of firms that 
are privately held (Song 2007).
In addition to investigating the relationship between 
ultimate ownership concentration and leverage, this study 
further examines whether there is a nonlinear relationship 
between ultimate ownership concentration and leverage. 
The findings are able to determine whether the decision 
on the capital structure is sensitive to the extent of the 
ownership concentration among Malaysian firms. Through 
signalling theory, the findings are able to imply how the 
concentration of the ultimate owners’ shareholdings 
can influence the extent of leverage from the agency 
perspective. To ascertain the existence of agency issues 
in the relationship between ownership concentration 
and leverage, this study further investigates whether the 
presence of high institutional shareholdings is able to 
more closely monitor the decision of the ultimate owner 
concerning capital structure. This study is able to show 
the existence of opportunistic behaviour on the part of the 
ultimate owners when high institutional share holdings 
are able to reduce leverage to signal better corporate 
governance evenwith the presence of a high ultimate 
ownership concentration. The ultimate findings of this 
study canprovide a solid reference to scholars and policy 
makers concerning the influence of the ultimate ownership 
concentration on the capital structure. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Agency problems arise as a result of the separation of 
ownership and control (Berle & Means 1932). Barnea, 
Haugen and Senbet (1985) view agency theory in finance 
as the application of the economic theory of agency to 
contractual relations in finance. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) associate capital structure theory with behavioural 
aspects of the principal-agent relationship. Theirs is 
a second landmark paper in capital structure theory, 
altering the direction of the theory. The agency problems 
that Jensen and Meckling propound are moral hazard 
agency problems. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue 
that the value of the firm is not fixed, as Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) assume, but instead depends on the actions 
of management, especially the consumption of “non-
pecuniary benefits” (perks). Examples of perks are fancy 
offices, private jets and the easy life. Perks are attractive to 
management but are of no interest to shareholders because 
they reduce firm value (Hart 2001). Therefore, Mehran 
(1992: 540)documents that capital structure theories that 
ignore agency theory may be “seriously incomplete”. 
Unlike other capital structure models that assume that 
managers always act in the best interests of shareholders, 
agency theory is concerned with situations in which 
managers pursue their self-serving interests at the expense 
of the value-maximizing activities of the firm (Jensen 
& Meckling 1976). The majority of the studies in the 
literature, such as those bySun et al. (2015), Florackis and 
Ozkan (2009), Datta et al. (2005), Brailsford et al. (2002) 
and Zwiebel (1996), illuminate the relationship between 
managerial ownership and leverage. These studies propose 
that a high debt ratio is able to discipline managers to 
prevent them from self-interested decision making. In 
summary, debt is viewed as a disciplinary mechanism 
that alleviates agency problems by constraining managers 
or controlling shareholders’ over investment behaviour 
(Grossman & Hart 1982; Jensen 1986).
Capital structure research is closely associated 
with signalling theory. Signalling theorists suggest that 
shareholders and lenders have significant asymmetric 
information regarding an investment prospect. To convey 
a positive signal to lenders regarding the strength of firms 
to payback the debt, firms attempt to adopt high leverage 
or rich accumulated assets. Lenders will typically evaluate 
the signal prior to issuing a loan to the firm. Empirical 
studies such as that by Ravid and Sarig (1991) consistently 
show that firms with better performance are highly 
leveraged and pay higher dividends to investors whereas 
firms with lower performance have lower leverage. It is 
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claimed that adopting high leverage implies the strength 
of firms with regard to opportunities for future growth. 
Regarding corporate governance, signalling theory 
predicts that high-quality corporate governance diminishes 
the role of leverage in mitigating moral hazards. In other 
words, good corporate governance plays an active role 
in monitoring managers’ decision making concerning 
the capital structure to prevent opportunistic behaviour. 
Thus, firms tend to adopt lower leverage to the reduce 
cost of financing if their strength is assured by having 
a good corporate governance system. In this case, a 
negative relationship between ownership concentration 
and leverage is expected, in accordance with signalling 
theory. 
According to the early study by Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986) and the recent study by Iliev et al. (2015), large 
shareholders are interested inusing their voting power to 
keep the quality of corporate governance in check. The 
incentive to monitor the management team is increased, 
especially to increase the ownership of blockholders 
(Mehran 1992). Large shareholders with concentrated 
ownership have sufficient rights to interrupt the decisions 
of managers. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) document that 
large shareholders may replace poor performing managers 
and cut discretionary spending, such as advertisement and 
entertainment expenditures. Given that a high ownership 
concentration guarantees active monitoring, managerial 
opportunism is less likely to occur. Therefore, debt 
becomes a less reliable signal to outsiders ofa firm’s status 
with regard to good corporate governance. The presence 
of shareholders with concentrated ownership serves as a 
signal of firms, guaranteeing optimal firm performance 
(Zeckhauser & Pound 1990). This interpretation based 
on signalling theoryexplains the negative relationship 
between the level of debt and the degree of ownership.
H
1 
There is a negative relationship between ultimate 
ownership concentration and leverage
In the literature, few studies raise Type II agency 
issues in the study of the capital structure, and the majority 
of the research on the capital structure focuses on Type I 
agency issues. Nonetheless, there is no implication that 
the Type II agency issues in decision making concerning 
the capital structure are insignificant; Jiraporn and 
Gleason (2007) have provided empirical evidence 
to show that shareholders’ power affects the capital 
structure. As documented by Claessens et al. (2002), 
the larger the control-ownership wedge of a controlling 
owner is, the higher the incentives of the owner to divert 
corporate resources for private benefits at the expense of 
minority shareholders. The study suggests that the issue 
of controlling shareholders’ expropriation of value from 
minority shareholders is the dominant agency problem in 
most countries. In the context of Malaysia, the majority 
of publicly listed firms are controlled by a small group 
of related parties and managed by owner-managers 
(The World Bank 2005). There arefewer conflicts of 
interest between managers and shareholders compared to 
Western firms, but there are significant conflicts of interest 
between the majority shareholders or internal managers 
and minority shareholders, which is a so-called Type II 
agencyissue.
Hope, Langli and Thomas (2012) suggest that a 
controlling owner can increase agency costs through 
extracting the private benefits of control from the firm. The 
implication is that Type II agency issue can be significant 
when the controlling shareholders have full control over 
the decisions of the firm. This phenomenon can be shown 
by Céspedes, González and Molina (2010), who find 
an inverse U-shaped relationship between ownership 
concentration and leverage. Their findings imply that 
there is a threshold for the contradicting influence of 
ownership concentration on leverage. Their study shows 
that shareholders with a less concentrated ownership 
have lower incentives to monitor the management and 
that adopting higher leverage is an alternative to replace 
the monitoring role of shareholders; when the ownership 
concentration exceeds a threshold, shareholders have 
greater control over the management’s decision making, 
and in this case, leverage is less essential from the 
perspective of corporate governance. The inverse U-
shaped relationship is consistently shown by Bruslerie 
and Latrous (2012).
H
2
 There is a nonlinear relationship between ultimate 
ownership concentration and leverage.
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) document that the presence 
of external blockholders can minimize the conflict 
of interest between shareholders and managers. The 
rationale is thata high ownership concentration increases 
the incentive to monitor managerial opportunism. A 
concentrated ownership leads to active monitoring over 
manager’s self-interested decision making concerning 
the capital structure. With their large shareholdings, 
institutional shareholders thus have stronger incentives and 
better skills in monitoring the role played (Grossman & 
Hart 1982). Previous studies such as those by McConnell 
and Servaes (1990), Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999), 
Nesbitt (1994), Smith (1996), Lundstrum (2009) and Sun 
et al. (2015) have found evidence that is consistent with 
the monitoring role played by institutional investors that 
can apply pressure to reduce opportunistic or self-serving 
behaviour. Institutional shareholders are able to exert 
their rights to influence corporate decisions (Maug 1998).
Institutional investors that have adequate voting power 
to influence corporate decisions may pressure managers 
to make dividend payments, which will lead to the need 
for future debt financing (La Porta et al. 2000). Sun et 
al. (2015) find that institutional ownership is positively 
related to firm leverage levels. They show that the presence 
of institutional shareholders encourages firms to choose 
debt as a governance mechanism to constrain managerial 
entrenchment, which is consistent with Ben-Nasr, 
Boubaker and Rouatbi (2015), who find that the presence 
of multiple large shareholders is associated with shorter 
debt maturity. These findings indicate that entrenched 
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controlling owners prefer longer debt maturity to avoid 
frequent monitoring by the debt market, which suggests 
that the institutional ownership concentration may 
moderate the relationship between ultimate ownership 
concentration and leverage. 
H
3
 The negative relationship between ownership 
concentration and leverage is moderated by a higher 
degree of institutional investors.
METHODOLOGY
The sample for this study is based on firm-level data 
from Malaysian firms listed on the main board (currently 
known as the Main Market) of Bursa Malaysia from 2001 
to 2012. Our sample period begins with the year 2001 
because it is the starting point for firms’ recovery from 
the negative impact of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
that struck the Malaysian market. Most Malaysian listed 
companies undertook several years of comprehensive 
restructuring after the crisis, and the process was ended 
officially in the year 2001 (Bany-Ariffin et al. 2010). 
Financial firms were dropped because they have different 
income measuring rules that govern these firms compared 
to firms from other sectors (Short & Keasey 1999). Cross-
sectional time series data are applied in this analysis. The 
time span of the data coverage is 12 years, extending from 
2001 to 2012. A total of 478 firms are selected over 813 
firms, covering approximately 60% of the population. 
The selection is based on data availability for ultimate 
ownership concentration. The other fundamental variables 
of the firms are obtained from Datastream, a division 
of Thomson Reuters. Institutional ownership data are 
purchased from Bursa Malaysia. There are a total of 5736 
firm-year observations in the analysis. Because there are 
some missing data at certain years for some firms, we are 
left with unbalanced panel data.
The data for the ultimate ownership information is 
manually collected from the annual reports of individual 
firms. Specifically, ultimate ownership is initially traced 
through the list of substantial shareholders in the annual 
report to identify the immediate largest shareholder. If the 
immediate largest shareholder belongs to a listed firm, 
then the trace in the annual report of that firm is continued 
to identify the next immediate largest shareholder. This 
process continues until we find the ultimate owner of the 
sample firms. If the firm is owned by a privately held 
firm, then the ultimate ownership is identified through the 
disclosure information as notes below the list of substantial 
shareholders. These notes are given to provide a more 
detailed explanation of how and from whence the indirect 
shareholdings of a substantial shareholder were derived. 
Data on firms’ political connections are manually collected 
through annual reports and other sources of information 
available online. The data on institutional ownership 
is obtained from Bursa Malaysia, an exchange holding 
company of the Malaysian stock market. 
To estimate the relationship between ultimate 
ownership concentration and leverage, model (1) 
is developed, modifying the leverage model by 
Wiwattanakantang (1999). The dependent variable is 
leverage, which is measured asthe ratio of total debts to 
total assets of firm i in year t. The control variables are 
firm size (FirmSizeit), measured as the natural logarithm 
of the total assets of firm i at year t, growth opportunity 
(Growthit), which is measured as the market-to-book value 
of firm i at year t, profitability (Profitabilityit), which is 
measured as the return on assets of firm i at year t, asset 
tangibility (Tangibleit), which is measured as the ratio of 
net tangible assets to total assets of firm i at year t,and 
firm dividend payout (Dividendit), which is measured 
as the dividend paid per share. The concentration of 
ultimate ownership (UltimateOwnershipit) is the ratio of 
the number of shares owned by the ultimate owners to the 
total outstanding shares of firm i in year t.
To fit the corporate governance environment in the 
context of Malaysia, this study takes into account the 
influence of politics on the firms’ leverage by incorporating 
a dummy variable for the political connections of firms. 
The reason is Johnson and Mitton (2003) document a 
significant relationship between politically connected 
firms and leverage in Malaysia. According to Johnson 
and Mitton (2003), politically connected firms are defined 
as firms with a close relationship with key government 
officials, and this information relies on Gomez and Jomo’s 
(1997) identification of politically connected firms in 
Malaysia. Both of these studies find that, in Malaysia, 
politically connected firms have significantly higher (on 
average, 11%) leverage than non-politically connected 
firms prior to the Asian financial crisis in July 1997. 
Therefore, a positive relationship between the political 
connections of firms and leverage is expected. Hence, the 
dummy variable of D_Politicsit is incorporated into the 
regression. The variable takes the value of one for firms 
that have political connections. A political connection is 
defined as a family member of the owner who is a leading 
politician and who sits on the board; an owner who has a 
close relationship with a politician; or a previous or current 
government servant who sits on the board of the firm. This 
information is obtained from Johnson and Mitton (2003) 
andthe annual reports.
Leverageit = α0 + β1 FirmSizeit + β2Growthit + 
β
3
Profitit + β4Tangibleit + β5DivPayit + β6D_Politicsit + 
β
7
UltimateOwnershipit + εit                                                                         (1) 
The majority of capital structure studies in Malaysia 
have confined their research to firm size (Tho 1993; 
Mohamad 1995; Mat Nor &Yatim 2000; Tay 2001; 
Ahmad-Zaluki et al. 2002). Previous studies show that firm 
size is an important determinant of leverage. The larger 
the firm size is, the greater the accessibility to external 
debt financing. Hence, a positive relationship between 
firm size and leverage is expected.The firms’ growth 
opportunity, measured by the market-to-book value, is also 
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a major determinant of leverage. It captures the changes in 
leverage resulting from equity mispricing. In accordance 
with asymmetric information theory, overvaluation leads 
to equity issuing, whereas undervaluation leads to debt 
issuing. Firms with higher market-to-book values should 
have lower leverage via equity issuance. However, 
firms with high growth opportunities have better access 
to external debt financing. Accordingly, a positive 
relationship between growth opportunity and leverage 
is expected. 
Additionally, firms with higher profitability have 
lower costs in bankruptcy and financial distress. With 
the use of debt as a monitoring device, the free cash flow 
problem is able to be minimized (Jensen 1986). Thus, 
profitable firms use more debt financing. A positive 
relationship is expected to obtain. The asset structure or 
tangibility of assets is another capital structure determinant 
that has attracted interest among local researchers such as 
Tho (1994), Pandey (2001), Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2002) 
and Kester and Isa (1994). Firms with more tangible assets 
are better able to secure debt, given that these assets can 
be used as collateral (Jensen & Meckling 1976). Indeed, 
tangible assets are worth more than intangible assets; 
therefore, they are of greater interest to bondholders, 
who generally demand a lower risk premium. Hence, a 
positive relationship between tangible assets and leverage 
is expected. Dividend payout is also found to be negatively 
related to leverage (Tho1994).
In this study, panel data analysis was used due to 
its merits with regard to cross-sectional and time-series 
analyses. According to Davidson and MacKinnon (2004), 
one of the advantages of panel data analysis over ordinary 
least squares regression is that panel data analysis is able 
to explicitly handle the heterogeneity of cross-sectional 
data by allowing for individual-specific effects. Panel data 
analysis also increases the number of data points, increases 
the degrees of freedomand reduces multicollinearity 
problem, which leads to more efficient estimates (Hsiao 
1986). In addition, Baltagi (2001) suggests that panel 
data analysis can control for the individual heterogeneity 
that is captured by firm-specific fixed effects or random 
effects components.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables 
used in this study. On average, firm adopt leverage of 22%, 
with approximately 25% of the firms having leverage 
lower than 10%. A total of 75% of the firms have adopted 
leverage lower than 33%. On average, firms have 1.50 
million Ringgit Malaysia of total assets, with the lowest 
being total 0.01 million and the largest 88 million Ringgit 
Malaysia. Market-to-book, a proxy for firms’ growth 
opportunities, has positive mean value of 1.07, with a 
maximum value of 12.28. Firms’ return on assets (ROA) 
is 4%onaverage, with a maximum ROA of 36%. There are 
a few firms have a negative ROA, demonstrating that these 
firms face losses in some years. The mean of the ratio of 
tangible assets to total assets is 0.58, with a minimum 
value of -0.25. The negative ratio value indicates that, 
for some firms, goodwill exceeds tangible assets. The 
mean value of ultimate ownership is 43%, and 75% of 
the sample has more than 50% ownership. This finding 
indicates that the majority of Malaysian firms have a high 
ownership concentration.
Table 2 presents the correlations between the 
dependent variable and independent variables, and 
the results ofthe variance inflation factor (VIF) for the 
multicollinearity testarereported in the table. It is noted 
that the ratio oftangible assets to total assets has a 
large negative coefficient of correlation with leverage, 
i.e., -0.7580. Dividend payout and ultimate ownership 
concentration also show negative correlations with 
leverage. Instead, firm size, market-to-book, ROA and 
political firms show positive correlations with leverage. 
The table shows thatnone of the independent variables 
ishighly correlated with each other and that the VIF 
values of each variable are low, which indicatesa lack of 
multicollinearity issues in the regression models. 
TABLE 1. Descriptive statistics
                                           Quantiles
 Obs Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max
Leverage 5640 0.22 0.20 0.00 0.06 0.20 0.33 4.63
Total Assets (million) 5640 1.50 5.20 0.01 0.15 0.33 0.86 88.00
Market-to-Book 5680 1.07 1.27 -0.96 0.49 0.77 1.20 12.28
Tangible Assets/Total Assets 5640 0.58 0.23 -0.25 0.43 0.59 0.75 1.13
Dividend Payout 5142 0.23 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.38 1.00
Returns on Assets 5536 0.04 0.08 -0.33 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.36
D_Politics 4683 0.61 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Ultimate Ownership  5555 0.43 0.17 0.09 0.30 0.43 0.55 0.88
Institutional Ownership 5650 0.30 0.23 0.00 0.09 0.26 0.50 0.83
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Table 3 presents the baseline results concerning the 
relationship between the control variables and leverage, 
using pooled ordinary least squares, random effect and 
firm fixed effect specifications. Overall, the results using 
pooled OLS, random effect and firm fixed effect models 
are nearly consistent. To choose the best regression model, 
we first run Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test 
to compare between random effect model and pooled OLS 
model; failing to reject null hypothesis of the test conclude 
that random effect is appropriate compared to pooled OLS. 
Then, we perform Hausman test to determine whether 
random effect or firm fixed effect is appropriate; the result 
show that fixed effect is appropriate. We choose to use 
fixed effect specification in the following regressions. 
Firm size is shown to have positive relationship 
with leverage, and the effect is significant at the 1% 
level. This finding supports the view that larger firms 
have better access to external debt financing. The ratio of 
tangible assets to total assets showsa negative relationship 
with leverage, and its effect is significant at the 1% 
level. For every one-unit increase intangible assets to 
total assets, leverage decreases by about 0.23 units.
The negative relationship can be explained by the asset 
substitution hypothesis, in which large tangible assets 
induce shareholders to invest in higher-risk projects for 
greater returns, which increasesthe default risks faced by 
debtholders. Accordingly, firms with high tangibility may 
face difficulty in searching for debt financing, especially in 
a developing country such as Malaysia wherethe investor 
protection legal system is weaker. Similarly, a negative 
relationship between tangible assets and leverage is found 
in Prime and Qi (2013), who use Chinese manufacturing 
firms in their analysis. 
TABLE 2. Correlations
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 VIF
1 Leverage 1.000         
2 FirmSize 0.1754 1.000        1.40
3 Growth 0.0025 0.1446 1.000       1.21
4 Tangible -0.7580 -0.2237 -0.0995 1.000      1.32
5 Dividend -0.2443 0.2314 0.2838 0.2609 1.000     1.35
6 Profitability 0.1864 -0.1870 -0.2943 -0.2059 -0.3093 1.000    1.25
7 D_Politics 0.0634 0.1996 -0.0015 -0.0682 -0.023 -0.0451 1.000   1.06
8 UltimateOwnership -0.0937 0.3364 0.1099 0.1052 0.2505 -0.1740 -0.0157 1.000  1.35
9 InstitutionalOwnership -0.0598 0.0685 0.0915 0.1660 0.1979 -0.1618 0.0165 0.3665 1.000 1.20
TABLE 3. Baseline results
 Pooled OLS Random Effect Firm Fixed Effect
Firm Size 0.0247*** 0.0265*** 0.0323***
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Market-to-Book 0.0037*** 0.0018 0.002
 (0.0039) (0.1947) (0.1732)
Tangible -0.2227*** -0.2351*** -0.2363***
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Dividend -0.0298*** -0.0093 -0.0035
 (0.0000) (0.1650) (0.6247)
ROA -0.0267 -0.0278** -0.0298** 
 (0.1124) (0.0433) (0.0342)
D_Politics 0.0097*** 0.0085** 0.0079
 (0.0013) (0.0427) (0.1186)
Constant -0.1023*** -0.1208*** -0.1950***
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 4244 4244 4244
R2 0.3563 0.3552 0.6555
F-Stat 392.44*** 1312.67*** 163.61***
Note:  ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance
 Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects is performed; the result fails to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that random effect is appropriate 
rather than OLS. Hausman test is further performed; the result shows chi-square of Hausman test 13.48, with p-value of 0.036, which implies to use fixed effects. 
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Return on assets (ROA) shows a significant positive 
relationship with leverage in random and fixed effect 
models. The result is consistent with previous studies that 
show that profitable firms have lower costsin bankruptcy 
and have greater access to debt financing. Market-to-
book and dividend payout do not show a significant 
impact on leverage in random and fixed effect models.
The insignificant relationship of dividend payout may 
imply that it is not significantly true that wealth transfers 
through dividend payments to shareholders at the expense 
of debtholders’ value. This study may contribute to the 
limited literature on wealth transfer by showing dividend 
pay out is not a significant wealth transfer path from 
the perspective of debtholders. The issue of political 
connections shows a significant positive relationship with 
leverage, which is expected from the literature review; 
however, the significant relationship disappears in the 
fixed effect specification, whereas the positive sign of the 
coefficient remains.
Table 4 shows the relationship between ultimate 
ownership concentration and leverage. It is found that 
ultimate ownership does not have a significant influence 
on leverage. When incorporating the square of the ultimate 
ownership concentration in the regression, it is found 
thatthere is a significant nonlinear relationship between 
ultimate ownership concentration and leverage. The 
signs of the coefficients of ultimate ownership with and 
without the square are the opposite, andthe square of the 
ultimate ownership concentration has a significant positive 
relationship with leverage, whereas the ultimate ownership 
concentration without the square has a significant negative 
relationship with leverage. The U-shaped nonlinearity 
contradicts the previous studies that obtain an inverse 
U-shaped nonlinearity. Nonetheless, the result obtained 
in this study is economically significant,which could be 
explained by the manner in which theexcessively high 
concentration of voting power in the hands of the ultimate 
owner has increased incentives to expropriate firm value 
for self-benefit. In this case, the owner tends to increase 
leverage to prevent firm value from declining due to 
expropriation. The U-shaped relationship obtained in this 
study, which is different from that obtained in previous 
studies, may be due to the emphasis on ultimate ownership 
concentration in this study instead of an exclusive focus 
on direct ownership without considering the pyramidal 
structure of ownership. This study claims that only by 
considering the ultimate ownershipis it possible to access 
the true power of the firm’s owner in influencing the 
important decisions made in the firms such as the decision 
concerning leverage. 
The overall results of Table 4 imply that, prior to 
exceeding a threshold value, every increase in ultimate 
ownership leads to a decrease in leverage. The opposite 
occurs when the ultimate ownership concentration exceeds 
the threshold. This study provides the threshold value for 
this case, i.e., 0.4224 or 42% of ownership concentration, 
using a pre-set Stata program coding.This finding leads 
to the notion that, in accordance with signalling theory, 
when controlling is less significant, i.e., below 42%of 
ownership, the owner tends to align herinterests with those 
of other shareholders to monitor opportunistic activities in 
the firmand replace the use of leverage in monitoring to 
reduce the cost of financing. However, when the owner has 
almost full control over decision making, she has a higher 
incentive to expropriate firm value for self-benefit rather 
than to share interests with the other shareholders.
TABLE 4. Regression results on ultimate ownership and 
leverage
 UO UO2
Firm Size 0.0325*** 0.0318***
 (0.0000) (0.0000)
Market-to-Book 0.0010 0.0010
 (0.5347) (0.4974)
Tangible -0.2395*** -0.2400***
 (0.0000) (0.0000)
Dividend -0.0019 -0.0013
 (0.7881) (0.8547)
ROA 0.0298** 0.0294** 
 -(0.0348) -(0.0367)
D_Politics 0.0081 0.0077
 (0.1093) (0.1291)
Ultimate Ownership 0.0097 -0.1568***
 (0.5452) (0.0059)
Ultimate Ownership2  0.1856***
  (0.0023)
Constant -0.1998*** -0.1588***
 (0.0000) (0.0004)
  
Ultimate Ownership
    turning point – 0.4224
Firm Effect Fixed Fixed
Observations 4202 4202
R2 0.6888 0.6896
F-Stat 139.20*** 123.23***
Note: ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance.
THE INFLUENCE OF INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS ON 
LEVERAGE DECISION MAKING
To further confirm the findings of  Table 5, i.e., the 
existence of Type II agency issues in decision making on 
leverage, this study further incorporates the influence of 
institutional ownership concentration in the regression. 
An interaction term for the institutional ownership 
concentration and ultimate ownership concentration is 
included in the regression. The rationale is that, with 
better skillsin monitoring the role played by institutional 
shareholders, a high institutional ownership concentration 
is able to increase the monitoring incentive and enhance 
corporate governance through a low leverage adoption 
based on signalling theory even with the presence of a 
high ultimate ownership. 
The results in Table 5 show that the interaction 
termsfor the institutional ownership concentration and 
ultimate ownership concentration (with and without 
square) have significant negative relationships with 
leverage. It is consistent with our hypothesis that,with the 
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presence of a high institutional ownership concentration, 
the monitoring of opportunistic activities in a firm becomes 
active. A high institutional ownership concentration, on 
one hand, can increase the incentive to monitor the 
expropriation issues thatcould reduce thevalue of the 
investment; on the other hand, it has greater power to 
monitor or speak in meetings to block decisions that are 
harmful for shareholder value. 
It is important to note that the interaction of the 
institutional ownership concentration with the square of 
the ultimate ownership concentration has a larger negative 
coefficient compared to when the interaction term involves 
no square of ultimate ownership concentration. This 
finding indicates that institutional shareholders tend to 
be more efficient in monitoring Type II agency issues via 
the signalling of lower leverage adoption when the firms’ 
owners havean excessively high ownership concentration. 
The results of Table 5support hypothesis 3 of this study.
The overall results demonstrate that the involvement 
of institutional shareholders has reduced the level of 
leverage in firms, which, from the perspective of signalling 
theory, implies a reduction in Type II agency issues. In 
other words, the results indicate that the institutional 
ownership concentration affects leverage, and the results 
further prove that expropriation by a high concentration 
of ownership can be observed via the level of leverage, 
which consolidates the view of signalling theory. 
SENSITIVITY TEST
RECONFIRMING THE TURNING POINT ON THE 
NONLINEARITIES USING LONG-TERM DEBTS TO TOTAL 
ASSETS AS LEVERAGE
This study conducts further sensitivity tests. First, instead 
of using total debts to total assets to measure leverage, this 
study uses different proxy of leverage by using long-term 
debts to total assets. Table 6 reconfirms the turning point 
found in the results of Table 4 by using the new definition 
of leverage. The intention is to show whether different 
definitions of leverage can change the turning point of 
the nonlinear relationship. By not using the pre-set coding 
of the Stata program, this study conducts a subsample 
analysis based on the turning point found in Table 4. 
Two regressions are performed by using two subsamples, 
one with the ultimate ownership concentration equal to 
or lesser than the threshold value, i.e., 42%, and another 
with the ultimate ownership concentration larger than the 
threshold value, i.e., 42%. The results show that there is 
a consistent, significant negative relationship between 
ultimate ownership concentration and leverage,as shown 
in the subsample with the ownership concentration equal 
to or less than 42%,and that there is a positive relationship 
in the subsample with the ownership concentration greater 
than 42%. 
TABLE 5. Regression results on the moderating role of 
institution shareholders
 UO x Institutional UO2 x Institutional
 Ownership Ownership
Firm Size 0.0328*** 0.0320***
 (0.0000) (0.0000)
Market-to-Book 0.0013 0.0014
 (0.4033) (0.3789)
Tangible -0.2378*** -0.2390***
 (0.0000) (0.0000)
Dividend -0.0021 -0.0013
 (0.7709) (0.8573)
ROA 0.0326** 0.0324** 
 (0.0208) (0.0215)
D_Politics 0.0078 0.0076
 (0.1216) (0.1332)
Ultimate Ownership 0.0393** -0.1631***
 (0.0269) (0.0041)
Ultimate Ownership* 
   InstitutionOwnership -0.0718*** 
 (0.0002) 
Ultimate Ownership2  0.2332***
  (0.0002)
Ultimate Ownership2 *
   InstitutionOwnership  -0.1085***
  (0.0001)
Constant -0.2073*** -0.1618***
 (0.0000) (0.0003)  
Firm Effect Fixed Fixed
Observations 4202 4202
R2 0.6900 0.6908
Note: ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance.
TABLE 6. Reconfirming turning point of nonlinear 
relationship using subsample regressions with different 
proxy of leverage
 Ultimate Ownership Ultimate Ownership 
 Concentration < 42% Concentration > 42%
Firm Size 0.0476*** 0.0223***
 (0.0000) (0.0000)
Market-to-Book 0.0041* -0.0002
 (0.0962) (0.9222)
Tangible -0.2143*** -0.2850***
 (0.0000) (0.0000)
Dividend 0.0066 -0.0069
 (0.5584) (0.4550)
ROA 0.0383** 0.0146
 (0.0403) (0.5310)
D_Politics -0.0010 0.0137** 
 (0.8950) (0.0491)
Ultimate
   Ownership -0.1065*** 0.1110***
 (0.0054) (0.0006)
Constant -0.3627*** -0.1004
 (0.0000) (0.1388)  
Firm Effect Fixed Fixed
Observations 2076 2126
R2 0.6724 0.7581
Note: ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance.
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Using the new proxy of leverage as long-term debts 
to total assets, regressions are re-run to test the moderating 
role of institution shareholdings with the firm fixed effect 
and random effect specifications to check the consistency 
of the results. The results of Table 7 are consistent with the 
previous results obtained in this study in both the firm fixed 
effect and random effect specifications. The test further 
consolidates the findings of this study that institutional 
shareholdings are able to reduce Type II agency issues 
due to the expropriation of firm value at the expense of 
minority shareholder value when owners have full control 
over decision making. 
TABLE 7. Sensitivity tests using different proxy of leverage with firm fixed effect and random effect
 Without  With Without With  
 Interaction Term Interaction Term Interaction Term Interaction Term
Firm Size 0.0319*** 0.0321*** 0.0264*** 0.0262***
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Market-to-Book 0.0013 0.0016 0.0012 0.0014
 (0.3948) (0.2893) (0.3690) (0.2884)
Tangible -0.2263*** -0.2253*** -0.2258*** -0.2248***
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Dividend -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0073 -0.007
 (0.7815) (0.7839) (0.2599) (0.2757)
ROA 0.0346** 0.0375*** 0.0345*** 0.0364***
 (0.0102) (0.0053) (0.0091) (0.0059)
D_Politics 0.0080* 0.0079*  0.0090** 0.0091** 
 (0.0953) (0.0986) (0.0272) (0.0254)
Ultimate Ownership -0.1367** -0.1430*** -0.1084** -0.1094** 
 (0.0119) (0.0085) (0.0237) (0.0223)
Ultimate Ownership2 0.1591*** 0.2063*** 0.1105** 0.1387***
 (0.0063) (0.0005) (0.0327) (0.0084)
Ultimate Ownership2 *  -0.1075***  -0.0702***
    InstitutionOwnership  (0.0001)  (0.0043)
Constant -0.1713*** -0.1743*** -0.1039*** -0.1027***
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Firm Effect Fixed Fixed Random Random
Observations 4202 4202 4202 4202
R2 0.6991 0.7004 0.3528 0.3501
Note: ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance.
CONCLUSION
This paper investigates the relationship between ultimate 
ownership concentration and leverage in the context of 
Malaysia. Given that the majority of Malaysian publicly 
listed firms have a high ownership concentration, 
investigating the ultimate ownership through direct 
and indirect shareholdings is able to contributenew 
findings to the literature on the influence of ownership 
concentration on the extent of leverage adoption. This 
study finds that ultimate ownership has a nonlinear 
relationship with leverage. Different from the findings 
of the existing literature, which show that a high direct 
ownership concentration increases the incentiveto 
monitor managerial decision making concerning leverage 
to prevent managerial opportunism, this study shows 
that a high ultimate ownership concentration induces 
opportunism by ultimate owners rather an alignment 
of interests with minority shareholders. The lack of 
awareness on the part of previous studies on the indirect 
shareholdings of firms’ owners may fail to capture the true 
ownership concentration of the owners, which may be the 
factor responsible for the opposite findings obtainedin the 
present study. 
The studyfurther suggests that a moderate extent 
of ultimate ownership concentration is able to enhance 
the incentive to monitor managers’ decision making 
concerning leverage. It replaces the disciplinary role 
of leverage in monitoring opportunistic activities 
andthus reduces the level of leverage to act as a 
corporate governance mechanism while lowering the 
cost of financing. For policy makers, the finding suggests 
controlling the owners’ shareholdings in a firm to prevent 
Type II agency problems. In this case, this study provides 
a reference that an ultimate ownership concentration of 
no greater than 42% is favourable. 
Furthermore, by investigating the moderating role 
of institutional shareholders in the relationship between 
ultimate ownership concentration and leverage, it is found 
that the self-interest sign of ultimate ownerswho have high 
voting rights to make decisions is reduced in the presence 
of high institutional shareholding. This finding indicates 
that the increased monitoring incentive of institutional 
shareholders following an increase in institutional 
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ownership has efficiently replaced the disciplinary role 
of leverage in governing opportunistic activities. The 
findings contribute to the literature that the ownership 
concentration of institutional shareholders is critical in 
reducing Type II agency problems. The implication is 
that aconcentrated ownership structure as in the case 
of Malaysia should have a high institutional ownership 
structure to protect the value of minority shareholders. 
The findings of this study lead to the notion that 
there should be a policy to regulate the shareholdings 
offirms’ ownersto prevent full control over decision 
making from falling into the hands of an individual. 
Institutional shareholders should play a vital role in 
monitoring decisions that are detrimental to firms. 
Increasing institutional shareholdings is encouraged to 
increase the incentives of institutional shareholders who 
are well-equipped with professional knowledge and skills 
to closely monitor the destructive decisions made in firms. 
In summary, the findings of this study show that the 
extent of the ultimate ownership concentration should be 
regulated and that high institutional shareholdings should 
be encouraged to prevent Type II agency issues, especially 
in a multiple-chain shareholding structure environment. 
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